Attaining Automaticity in the Visual Numerosity Task is Not Automatic by Craig P. Speelman & Katrina L. Muller Townsend
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 17 November 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01744
Edited by:
Pietro Cipresso,
IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano,
Italy
Reviewed by:
Evgueni Borokhovski,
Concordia University, Canada
Konrad Schnabel,
International Psychoanalytic University
Berlin, Germany
*Correspondence:
Craig P. Speelman
c.speelman@ecu.edu.au
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Quantitative Psychology
and Measurement,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 24 June 2015
Accepted: 30 October 2015
Published: 17 November 2015
Citation:
Speelman CP and Muller
Townsend KL (2015) Attaining
Automaticity in the Visual Numerosity
Task is Not Automatic.
Front. Psychol. 6:1744.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01744
Attaining Automaticity in the Visual
Numerosity Task is Not Automatic
Craig P. Speelman* and Katrina L. Muller Townsend
School of Psychology and Social Science, Edith Cowan University, Joondalup, WA, Australia
This experiment is a replication of experiments reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993)
using the visual numerosity task. The aim was to replicate the transition from controlled
to automatic processing reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993), and to examine
the extent to which this result, reported with average group results, can be observed
in the results of individuals within a group. The group results in this experiment did
replicate those reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993); however, one half of the sample
did not attain automaticity with the task, and one-third did not exhibit a transition
from controlled to automatic processing. These results raise questions about the
pervasiveness of automaticity, and the interpretation of group means when examining
cognitive processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Speelman and McGann’s (2013) paper contained a clear message for Psychology: Be wary of
phenomena that are discovered on the basis of average group data. Speelman and McGann (2013)
argued that the averaging process typically used in the analysis methods adopted by Psychology can
mask individual results that may actually be counter to those revealed by the group results. As a
result, group results may not be an accurate reﬂection of the behavior of many, and possibly most,
individuals in the group.
Most of the phenomena we teach as the basic facts in an introductory course in Cognitive
Psychology have typically been generated by experiments where groups of subjects perform the
same task under various conditions. The classic result is usually observed and interpreted as a
pattern of diﬀerences between group and/or condition means. That is, the take-homemessage from
these experiments is usually represented as a pattern of results that are generated by averaging
across the results of individuals. This results in a ‘clean’ picture of behavior where the noise
associated with individual diﬀerences has eﬀectively been removed. Thus well-known eﬀects such
as the word superiority eﬀect, the serial position curve, the power law of learning, and the
phonological similarity eﬀect have been well replicated by diﬀerent researchers and under diﬀerent
conditions, but they all are observed by averaging data collected from groups of individuals.
Speelman andMcGann (2013) argued that such eﬀects may not be as pervasive as their replicability
suggests. That is, although the eﬀects can be replicated easily enough, they may only exist when the
data from several individuals are combined, and as a result may not reﬂect the cognitive processes
of many, and at worst, any individuals in that group.
Speelman and McGann (2013) reported results from a replication of the Word Superiority
Eﬀect. Although the average performance of the sample in their experiment replicated the classic
eﬀect, an examination of the performance of individuals in the sample revealed that very few people
produced results consistent with the eﬀect. Speelman andMcGann (2013) argued that such a result
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should reduce the conﬁdence we have in using means to
reveal information about fundamental cognitive processes.
A further implication of this result is that it may be prudent
to determine the extent to which individuals demonstrate
performance patterns that have to date been demonstrated in
group results.
The research reported in this paper was designed to examine
a well-replicated ﬁnding in the ﬁeld of attention. From at
least as far back as the 1970s, researchers (e.g., Posner
and Snyder, 1975; Schneider and Shiﬀrin, 1977; Hasher and
Zacks, 1979) have drawn a distinction between automatic
and controlled/conscious/eﬀortful forms of mental processing.
Controlled processes are typically exhibited early in the practice
of a task, while we are more likely to perform automatically after
a long period of practice. Controlled, deliberate psychological
processes are used for diﬃcult and unfamiliar tasks. These
processes operate serially, use substantial cognitive resources,
require attention, and are ﬂexible. In contrast, automatic
processes are used for easy and familiar tasks, operate in parallel,
require very few cognitive resources, do not require attention, and
are diﬃcult to modify (Speelman andMaybery, 1998). Automatic
performance only comes after extensive practice. Thus, with
suﬃcient practice under appropriate conditions (Schneider and
Shiﬀrin, 1977; Shiﬀrin and Schneider, 1977) one can develop the
ability to respond in an automatic fashion to particular stimuli.
Most theories of cognitive skill acquisition describe
mechanisms by which practice produces a shift from controlled
to automatic processing (e.g., Logan, 1988; Anderson and
Lebiere, 1998). Although these theories propose diﬀerent means
by which practice leads to more eﬃcient processing, all of the
theories lead to the same prediction: with suﬃcient practice of
a task where the stimulus–response relationship is consistent,
performance will reach the stage where perception of a known
stimulus will trigger an automatic response (i.e., seeing ‘3× 4= ?’
will automatically lead to a response of ‘12’).
This view of the development of automatic processing has
inﬂuenced ideas of how we acquire complex skills. When we
initially embark on the acquisition of such skills, eﬀort, and
attention are focused on basic, low level tasks (e.g., recognizing
letters when learning to read). These tasks are practiced until
processes are developed that perform this task automatically.
Initially, these processes require most of the available cognitive
resources to proceed. Little capacity is available for any other
task (e.g., reading words). Once these processes have become
automatic, however, suﬃcient cognitive resources are available
for the person to attempt higher level tasks (e.g., reading
words). Importantly, higher level tasks (i.e., reading words) are
considered to operate on the outcomes from lower level tasks
(e.g., letter identiﬁcation; Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1979). With further
practice, processes will be developed that are speciﬁc to the higher
level task and these in turn may become automatic, enabling
further developments in the level of skill (Speelman and Kirsner,
2005). This view is clearly articulated in mainstream educational
practice (e.g., Cumming and Elkins, 1999; Caron, 2007; Baroody
et al., 2009).
Automaticity can be attained quickly with simple tasks.
Lassaline and Logan (1993) trained subjects on a visual
numerosity task. In this task pictures of dots or similar, ranging
in number from 6 to 11 and arranged in a seemingly random
manner, are presented on a computer screen, one at a time
(Figure 1). Subjects are required to indicate how many dots are
presented, as quickly as possible. Typically, the speed with which
subjects can perform this task is associated with the number of
dots on the screen. That is, the more dots in a picture, the slower
the reaction time (RT). However, when pictures are repeated, and
subjects have a lot of practice at the task, eventually their RTs
are no longer associated with the number of dots in a picture –
subjects respond to each picture with equivalent speed (Figure 2).
According to Logan’s (1988) theory of skill acquisition, early in
training subjects count the dots and this typically takes longer to
complete the more dots there are in a picture. Late in training,
subjects are more likely to recognize pictures and so remember
the number of dots rather than have to count them. As a result
they can respond to each picture with the same speed and hence
RT will not be a function of the number of dots in a picture. An
RT line with a zero slope, therefore, indicates automaticity of this
response.
In Lassaline and Logan’s (1993) experiments, subjects reached
this state after four sessions of training (1920 trials and 64
repetitions per item). Lassaline and Logan (1993) interpreted
this change in the pattern of RTs as subjects moving from a
counting strategy early in practice (a controlled process) to a
memory strategy later in practice (i.e., subjects recognized each
picture and remembered the correct response – an automatic
process).
FIGURE 1 | An example of the type of dot picture used by Lassaline
and Logan (1993). Subjects are asked to indicate the number of dots in the
picture.
FIGURE 2 | Reaction time (RT) in the visual numerosity task as a
function of number of dots in each stimulus picture.
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A similar explanation invoking a transition from controlled
to automatic processing has been used to account for results
in the alphabet arithmetic task (Logan, 1988) and memory
scanning (Schneider and Shiﬀrin, 1977). The fact that the
pattern of performance changes that accompany practice are
so easily replicated has no doubt fostered conﬁdence in this
explanation. What is not clear in any of this research, however,
is the extent to which this transition occurs in individuals.
The traditional approach in this area of research, as in many
other areas of cognitive psychology, is to collect data from
groups of subjects, and analyze the trends in the average results.
Certainly, theories such as Logan’s (1988) have been developed
to explain the average results. But are these theories a good
explanation for what occurs in the minds of all individuals when
they practice any of these tasks? It is diﬃcult to answer this
question because it is not traditional practice to publish data
that reﬂects how well the average trends match the pattern of
results produced by each individual. The aim of the experiment
reported here was to provide data that could be used to
answer this question with respect to the visual numerosity
task.
The experiment was an attempt to replicate the results
reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993) and depicted in Figure 2.
In addition, we looked at the individual RT results of each subject
to determine the extent to which the apparent transition from
controlled to automatic processing occurs in a sample of people.
If a result similar to that reported by Speelman and McGann
(2013) was obtained – that is, that the group results replicate the
classic eﬀect but that a substantial proportion of the sample do
not show the eﬀect – then this would raise questions regarding
the validity of theories designed to explain the group results.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Eighteen psychology students from Edith Cowan University
voluntarily participated in the study. The inclusion criteria
required participants to have ‘corrected’ or ‘corrected-to-normal’
vision and English as their primary language. The participants’
ages ranged from 19 to 65 years (Table 1). Participants were
reimbursed with a $20 shopping voucher for their time. This
experiment was approved by the Edith CowanUniversity Human
Research Ethics Committee. All subjects granted their written
informed consent to participate in the experiment.
Design and Stimuli
The visual numerosity task used in this experiment was
performed as part of a larger task used to examine transfer of
training issues. Each trial had two parts. In the ﬁrst part of each
trial, a conﬁguration of asterisks was presented on the computer
screen. Subjects were asked to indicate the number of asterisks as
quickly as possible by pressing one of six buttons on a response
box. The second part of each trial involved subjects adding a
number presented on the screen to the number of dots that
had been presented in the previous part. Subjects then decided
whether the sum was an odd or even number, indicating their
decision by pressing the appropriate button on the response
TABLE 1 | Slopes of regression lines (ms/asterisk) fitted to RT data as a function of numerosity for each subject.
Participant Age (years) Early slope Mid slope Late slope Matches auto pattern Auto (<100 ms)
1 48 157.83 (0.42) 264.35 (0.71) 329.44 (0.66)
2 55 221.06 (0.74) 174.39 (0.64) 147.55 (0.52) y
3 47 194.95 (0.21) −21.02 (0.01) −45.10 (0.02) y y
4 49 106.44 (0.23) −16.02 (0.00) −77.38 (0.15) y y
5 49 425.72 (0.94) 335.25 (0.75) 377.09 (0.80)
6 57 247.66 (0.82) 224.68 (0.69) 263.65 (0.69)
7 25 336.01 (0.68) −95.78 (0.07) −71.43 (0.07) y y
8 23 381.07 (0.81) 305.30 (0.81) 218.92 (0.92) y
9 27 264.21 (0.90) 361.59 (0.91) 250.73 (0.54)
10 31 318.85 (0.84) 41.37 (0.09) 6.13 (0.00) y y
11 28 193.07 (0.38) −15.49 (0.00) −126.67 (0.07) y y
12 39 277.37 (0.85) 90.37 (0.27) 59.12 (0.08) y y
13 65 367.46 (0.50) 254.99 (0.32) 248.84 (0.55) y
14 20 309.01 (0.88) 537.37 (0.52) 232.21 (0.34)
15 23 625.63 (0.58) 86.52 (0.13) −54.47 (0.25) y y
16 19 447.66 (0.70) 551.07 (0.84) 450.31 (0.78)
17 30 290.94 (0.83) 108.88 (0.24) −11.66 (0.00) y y
18 48 216.73 (0.52) 38.69 (0.01) −65.27 (0.12) y y
Mean/total 37.94 298.98 (0.94) 179.25 (0.57) 118.44 (0.46) 12/18 9/18
r with age –0.42ns −0.19ns 0.09ns
Values in parentheses are r2 values for the regression lines. Matches auto pattern: y = yes, slopes descend from Early to Mid to Late. Auto (<100 ms): y = yes,
slope = 100ms or less by the Late period. ns = p > 0.05.
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box. Only data from the visual numerosity part of each trial is
considered in this paper.
Six stimuli were prepared for this experiment, one for each
level of numerosity from 6 to 11. In each stimulus, asterisks were
arranged in a pseudo-random manner, with the constraint that
each asterisk was separated from other asterisks by at least 1 cm.
Procedure
Subjects were provided with 12 trials of practice using stimuli that
were not used in the experimental trials but which were similar in
appearance to the experimental stimuli. Once participants fully
understood the procedure the experimental trials began. In part
one of each trial a ﬁxation point appeared in the centre of the
screen for 250ms, followed by a conﬁguration of asterisks ranging
in number from 6 to 11. Subjects were required to determine
the number of asterisks. The picture remained on screen until
a response was made on the response box by pressing one of
the keys labeled 6–11. A blank screen then followed for 250 ms.
Participants were then asked to add a number to the number of
stars just identiﬁed and determine whether the answer was odd
or even by pressing the corresponding keys. Participants were
instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible.
Trials were presented in blocks of six. The six trials within each
block were presented in a random order. There were 50 blocks of
trials, leading to 300 trials, with each stimulus being presented 50
times.
RESULTS
Accuracy of responses was examined to ensure that participants
were not guessing with their responses. All participants
maintained a mean accuracy above 80% for each block of trials.
Average RT across all levels of numerosity for each block was
calculated. Figure 3 shows RT as a function of practice for each
block. Mean RT for the group became faster over the experiment,
and is well described by a power function.
Blocks were examined in phases (each block consisted of six
trials): Early (blocks 1–10); Mid (blocks 21–30); and Late (blocks
41–50). Mean RT for each level of numerosity for each phase
is presented in Figure 4. The slope of a regression line relating
response latency to numerosity was calculated for each of the
three phases to determine whether automaticity was reached.
These values are presented in Table 1. Although the slope values
follow the pattern of results reported by Lassaline and Logan
(1993) – that is, the slopes decline in value from Early to Late in
practice – the Late result does not reach 0 ms/asterisk, as would
be expected if the results reﬂected complete automaticity. The
slope value in the Late phase (118.44 ms/asterisk), however, is
consistent with the slope value reported by Lassaline and Logan
(1993) in several experiments after a similar amount of practice
(circa 100 ms/asterisk).
Regression lines were also ﬁtted to the RT data as a function
of numerosity for each phase and for each subject. The slope
values for these lines are presented in Table 1. Two analyses
were performed with this data. The ﬁrst examined the number
of subjects whose slope values followed the pattern of the slopes
FIGURE 3 | Mean RT for each block of trials. The smooth line is the
best-fit power function (RT = 342.30 + 3500 × block−0.13, r2 = 0.86, and
rmsd = 99.68).
FIGURE 4 | Mean RT as a function of numerosity for the three phases
of the experiment.
calculated on group data. Twelve out of 18 (67%) subjects fell into
this category, although subject 13 barely shows a reduction in
slope value from the Mid to the Late phase. The other analysis
of slope values looked at whether or not a subject reached a slope
value of 100 ms/asterisk or less, to signify whether a subject had
reached automaticity. This was the same cut-oﬀ point as used
with the group results. The slope values of nine out of 18 (50%)
subjects met this criterion.
A further test was performed to determine whether the pattern
of slope value changes from phase to phase was consistent
amongst the subjects. Kendall’s coeﬃcient of concordance
indicated that there was some degree of consistency amongst
subjects in their slope value changes (W = 0.373, X2(2)= 13.444,
p= 0.001). However, the fact thatW was not equal to 1 indicates
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that there was not complete unanimity in the pattern of slope
changes, and being closer to 0 than 1 supports the fact that there
was a sub-set of subjects that did not show the typical pattern of
slope reductions throughout training.
To explore whether some characteristic of the subjects was
associated with the likelihood of them attaining automaticity,
Pearson correlation coeﬃcients were calculated between subject’s
age and the regression slopes in the three practice phases. These
values are reported in Table 1. None of these correlations were
statistically signiﬁcant.
DISCUSSION
This experiment replicated the result reported by Lassaline and
Logan (1993). That is, practice with the visual numerosity task
resulted in a change in the pattern of performance, with RT early
in practice being a function of numerosity (i.e., the more asterisks
to be counted, the longer the RT), whereas later in practice the
relationship between RT and numerosity became weaker. These
results can, therefore, be explained by the typical account, that
performance has moved from a controlled form of processing
early in practice (i.e., counting asterisks in a serial manner) to
automatic processing (i.e., subjects recognize each stimulus and
remember the number of asterisks in the picture). At least, this is
what the group results suggest.
A diﬀerent picture is apparent when the results of individual
subjects are considered. First, only half of the sample produced
results that suggested they had reached automaticity with the
task. Second, at least one-third of the sample did not show results
consistent with the group trend that replicated Lassaline and
Logan’s (1993) result. Thus, for this latter sub-group, there is no
evidence that their results reﬂected a transition from controlled
to automatic processing. So, although the overall group results
reﬂect a pattern that describes well the results of two thirds of
the sample, they do not reﬂect the pattern of behavior in all
subjects. Indeed, a sizeable minority exhibited results that suggest
there was nomove toward automatic performance with the visual
numerosity task.
One possible explanation for why so many people in this
experiment did not attain automatic performance concerns the
nature of the task used in this experiment, which diﬀered from
that used by Lassaline and Logan (1993). In this experiment there
were two parts to each trial. The results reported in this paper
only concerned the ﬁrst part of each trial, the part that matched
the task used by Lassaline and Logan (1993). It is possible that
the presence of the second part of each trial in this experiment
may have contributed to many subjects not showing a transition
to automatic performance. On the other hand, the fact that the
group results for this experiment were consistent with the group
results reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993) indicates that the
two-part structure to each trial did not aﬀect the overall results.
It is therefore not possible to rule this explanation in or out at
this stage without knowing the individual results of subjects in
the Lassaline and Logan (1993) experiments. It is worth noting,
though, that in other visual numerosity experiments we have
conducted in our laboratory with a similar two-part structure
to each trial, the group results suggested a transition from
controlled to automatic processing, whereas the individual results
indicated that this transition was not universal. That is, in three
experiments, 7/16, 15/20, and 23/40 people showed a transition
to automaticity.
Another possible point of diﬀerence between our experiment
and those reported by Lassaline and Logan (1993) concerns
age. Lassaline and Logan (1993) did not report the ages of
their subjects, only that they were undergraduate Psychology
students. Our subjects also were undergraduate Psychology
students, however, given the age proﬁle of students at Edith
CowanUniversity, the age range of our subjects being 19–65 years
is not unusual. It may well be the case that the age range of our
subjects is larger than the age range of subjects in Lassaline and
Logan’s (1993) experiments; however, age was not correlated with
our measure of automaticity (regression line slopes) at any point
in the experiment, and so cannot explain why so many subjects
did not attain automaticity.
At the least, this experiment questions the conclusions that
can be drawn from group results on the visual numerosity
task. Although the group results are consistent with a transition
from controlled to automatic processing, they do not reﬂect
the performance of all subjects in the group. Even though
there was a similar number of repetitions per item in this
experiment (50 repetitions/item) to that in Lassaline and Logan’s
(1993) experiments (up to 64 repetitions/item), and so a
similar opportunity to attain automaticity, some subjects in this
experiment showed no evidence of moving toward automatic
processing. Indeed, it seems that these people continued to count
asterisks throughout the experiment. Thus, the transition from
controlled to automatic processing as a result of practice with
a task, which is a feature of many theories of skill acquisition
(e.g., Logan, 1988; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998), may not be an
automatic feature of skill acquisition, at least for some people.
Other work has demonstrated that not all experimental subjects
adopt more eﬃcient performance strategies when acquiring
skills, but rather just improve the application of a less-eﬃcient
strategy (Rowell et al., 2015). It is now an open question as to
why some people do not exhibit this transition whenmany others
do. Importantly, this is a question that would never arise without
attention to diﬀerences between individual and group results
(Speelman and McGann, 2013).
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